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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
LEONARD D. WATERS, 
Deceased. 
HELENA WATERS, personal 
representative of the Estate of Leonard D. 
Waters, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
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THEORDORA ANN (TEDDI) BROWN, 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20000017-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal lies with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) and the Orders of the Utah Supreme Court dated March 28,2000 
(Addendum 1) and the Utah Court of Appeals dated April 24, 2000 (Addendum 2). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The Trial Court abused its discretion and violated the "law of the case" 
doctrine in disregarding the prior Order entered June 22, 1999 directing the proceeds from 
a settlement of the Nevada action be paid to the Decedent's estate. 
2. The December 13, 1999 (Addendum 3) Order contains numerous findings of 
fact and conclusions of law that are clearly erroneous or constitute legal error, and are not 
supported by any evidence. 
3. The Trial Court abused its discretion by contravening the written agreement 
and stipulation of the parties in the December 13, 1999 Order. 
4. The Trial Court further abused its discretion in ordering the filing of an 
interpleader action between the parties. 
5. The Trial Court abused its discretion in ruling that the Petitioner was not 
entitled to a statutory homestead allowance and that the statutory exempt personal property 
allowance could not be granted without an evidentiary hearing. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The appropriate standard of review for challenging a finding of fact is a clearly 
erroneous standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). The appropriate 
standard of review for challenging conclusions of law is legal error or correctness. State v. 
Pena. 69 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); AMS Salt Industries v. Mag. Corp. of America, 942 
P.2d 315, 319 (Utah 1997). The appropriate standard of review for challenging a 
discretionary ruling is abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious action by the Court. 
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Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993); Kunzler v. O'Pell 855 
P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are submitted as determinative: 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-401 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-402 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-403 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-404 
Uniform Probate Code Practice Manual, Vol. I, pg. 110-114 
These statutes are included in their entirety at Addendum 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from two interlocutory Orders entered by the Third District Court, 
Tooele County, State of Utah, in the administration of the estate of the Decedent, Leonard 
Waters, who died in Tooele County on December 14, 1996. The two interlocutory Orders 
were entered on December 13, 1999 (Addendum 3) and March 16, 2000 (Addendum 5), 
respectively. Petitioner filed a Petition to appeal the December 13,1999 interlocutory order 
on January 3,2000. Prior to the entry of the December 13, 1999 order, Petitioner had filed 
an Objection to the proposed Order submitted by the Respondents and a Rule 59 Motion for 
Reconsideration on December 1, 1999. Since the District Court did not rule on said 
Objection and Motion for Reconsideration prior to the December 13, 1999 order, the trial 
court ruled on those matters in the March 16, 2000 Order which denied Petitioner's 
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Objection and Motion for Reconsideration and clarified the December 13,1999 Order adding 
new findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Utah Supreme Court granted Petitioner's 
Petition to Appeal an Interlocutory Order on March 28, 2000 and the Court of Appeals 
granted Petitioner's Amended Petition to Appeal an Interlocutory Order in an Order dated 
April 24, 2000, 
The essence of this appeal is that the trial court violated the "law of the case" doctrine 
and abused its discretion in overruling a prior order of the Court on the same issue and 
wrongfully denied Petitioner a statutorily-mandated homestead allowance and exempt 
personal property allowance as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §75-2-401 and 402. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
L Decedent, Leonard D. Waters, died intestate on December 14,1996 at the age 
of 61 years. (R.l-4; R.8-10). 
2. Petitioner, Helena Waters, was the Decedent's spouse and was informally 
appointed personal representative of Decedent's estate by the Third District Court for Tooele 
County on December 29 1997, and later formally appointed on June 22, 1999. (R. 8-10; 
R.70-73). 
3, Prior to his death, Decedent had been injured in an auto-pedestrian accident 
in Clark County, Nevada on January 18, 1996. Petitioner filed an action in Clark County, 
State of Nevada, entitled Helena Waters, et al. v. Michelle Dennisoiu Civil No. A382762. 
Pursuant to the Complaint, that action consisted of three causes of action, to wit: (1) an 
action for personal injuries, medical expenses, pain and suffering, and other damages 
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sustained by Decedent and his estate; (2) an action for loss of consortium filed on behalf of 
the Decedent's spouse; and (3) an action for wrongful death filed by the Decedent's spouse 
and the Decedent's adult children from a prior marriage (hereinafter "Respondents"). (R. 
19-24 Exhibit "A"; R. 172-177 Exhibit "B"). 
4. Settlement for policy limits of $100,000.00 was reached with the insurer of 
Michelle Dennison in early 1999. The Decedent had sustained medical expenses from his 
injuries in excess of $100,000.00. The holder of medical lien for $93,000.00 compromised 
and reduced its claim to $30,000.00. After a deduction for attorney's fees, costs, and 
expenses, the sum of $30,839.94 remained payable to the plaintiffs in the Nevada action. 
Neither the settlement agreement nor the Nevada Court made any allocation of the settlement 
proceeds between the Nevada plaintiffs [Petitioner and Respondents] or the causes of action 
in the Complaint. (R. 32-34 Exhibit "C"; R. 35-37 Exhibit "D"; R.40-42 Exhibit "F"; R. 66-
69). 
5, The attorney for the Nevada plaintiffs, Bob Benton, advised the parties of a 
potential conflict of interest as to the distribution of the settlement proceeds in a letter dated 
April 13, 1999. (R. 178-180 Exhibit "C"). After consulting with each of the Nevada 
plaintiffs prior to obtaining their consent, each plaintiff executed a stipulation and agreement 
that the entire proceeds from the settlement should be paid to the Decedent's estate to be 
administered by the Third District Court in Tooele County, State of Utah under the laws of 
intestate distribution as adopted in the State of Utah. (R. 38-39 Exhibit "E"; R. 181-184 
Exhibit "D"). 
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6. Petitioner filed a Petition for Approval of Settlement in the Third District Court 
on April 7, 1999. A hearing on said Petitioner was held on May 24, 1999. Several of the 
Respondents of the hearing and did not make any objection to the proposed Order when the 
Order was mailed to all parties. (R. 14-42; R. 62). 
7. On June 22, 1999, Judge Leon Dever of the Third District Court signed and 
entered an Order Approving Wrongful Death Settlement (Addendum 6). Said Order directed 
that the proceeds of the settlement were to paid to the Decedent's estate and further 
specifically found that the Nevada plaintiffs had stipulated and agreed that the settlement 
proceeds should be considered an asset of Decedent's estate. (R.66-69) 
8. On July 8,1999, Petitioner filed Petitions for Homestead and Exempt Personal 
Property Allowance (R. 86-88), and for Family Allowance (R.74-85) as authorized by Utah 
Code Ann. §25-2-401, 402, 403, and 404. Respondents thereafter filed objections to the 
Petition for Homestead and Exempt Personal Property Allowance. (R. 91-93). 
9. On September 22, 1999, the Court directed Petitioner to file a memorandum 
in support of her Petition for Homestead and Exempt Personal Property Allowance. (R. 108-
120). Respondents filed a memorandum in opposition (R. 126-136) and Petitioner filed a 
reply memorandum. (R. 137-159). 
10. On November 15, 1999, a hearing for oral argument was scheduled on 
Petitioner's Petitions and Respondents9 objections thereto. However, the Court sui sponte 
on its on motion and without any reason or suggestion by any party, directed that the 
settlement proceeds from the Nevada case be withdrawn from the estate and that an action 
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in interpleader be filed so that an appropriate division of the settlement proceeds could be 
determined. Neither party was given an opportunity to address the Court's order. The Court 
did not receive evidence nor hear argument on Petitioner's Petitions at that time and did not 
make any ruling thereon. (R. 160; R. 198-200). 
11. On December 13,1999, the Court entered the first Order which is the subject 
of this appeal memorializing the rulings at the November 15, 1999 hearing. (R. 198-200). 
12. On December 1, 1999, Petitioner filed an Objection to the Proposed Order as 
drafted by Respondents and a Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 161-186). The Court had not 
considered Petitioner's Objection or Rule 59 Motion for Reconsideration prior to the Order. 
On January 11, 2000, the Court entered an Order staying the December 13, 1999 Order 
pending further hearing. (R. 213-214). The Objection and the Motion for Reconsideration 
were not ruled upon until after Petitioner commenced her interlocutory appeal proceeding. 
(R. 216). 
13. A hearing was held on January 31,2000 on Petitioner's Objection, Motion for 
Reconsideration, and the Motion for Approval of Homestead and Exempt Personal Property 
Allowances filed July 8, 1999. At said hearing, the Court denied Petitioner's Objection, 
Motion for Reconsideration, and further denied Petitioner's Motion for Homestead 
Allowance and indicated that the Petition for Exempt Personal Property Allowance would 
be predicated on a subsequent evidentiary proceeding. (R. 216). 
14. On March 16, 2000, the Court entered the second interlocutory Order which 
is the subject of this Appeal. Said Order clarified the December 13,1999 Order and added 
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new findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court further refused to certify the two 
Orders as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 210-221). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court abused its discretion in entering the December 13, 1999 Order and 
violated the "law of the case" doctrine in disregarding the prior order of the same Court 
entered June 22,1999 directing the proceeds from a settlement of the Nevada action be paid 
to the Decedent's estate. The Trial Court further abused its discretion in overruling a further 
specific finding that the Nevada plaintiffs had stipulated and consented that the settlement 
proceeds should be considered an asset of the Decedent's estate. Without any evidentiary 
hearing or consideration of sworn affidavits, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering 
that said proceeds be withdrawn from Decedent's estate and that a Rule 22 interpleader 
action be filed between the Petitioner and Respondents to determine the distribution of the 
settlement proceeds. Furthermore, numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law in said 
Order are clearly erroneous or constitute legal error. Finally, the trial court abused its 
discretion in ruling on March 13, 2000 that the Petitioner, as Decedent's spouse, was not 
entitled to a statutory homestead allowance as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §75-2-401 and 
404 and that the exempt personal property allowance set forth in Utah Code Ann. §75-2-402 
was not absolute and could not be granted without an evidentiary hearing. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE "LAW 
OF THE CASE" DOCTRINE IN 
DISREGARDING THE PRIOR ORDER 
ENTERED JUNE 22, 1999 DIRECTING THE 
PROCEEDS FROM A SETTLEMENT OF THE 
NEVADA ACTION BE PAID TO THE 
DECEDENT'S ESTATE. 
The December 13, 1999 Order (R. 198-200) entered by Judge David Young of the 
Third District Court is in direct contravention and opposition to the June 22,1999 Order (R. 
66-69) entered by Judge Leon Dever of the Third District Court. The June 22, 1999 Order 
was entered after full notice to all parties and a scheduled hearing at which certain of the 
Respondents were present and at which no objection was raised. The June 22, 1999 Order 
specifically found as a finding of fact that: 
8. Since the aforementioned settlement did not differentiate 
between the various claims of the estate and those of the 
individual Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs stipulated and agreed that the 
net proceeds from the settlement of the aforementioned lawsuit 
shall be considered an asset of the Decedent's estate and shall 
be distributed to the heirs of Decedent's estate according to the 
laws of intestate succession for the State of Utah. (R. 198-200). 
Judge Young in his December 13, 1999 Order completely ignored this finding of fact and 
without any evidentiary hearing or other factual ruling whatsoever entered the following 
finding of fact: 
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6. The proceeds of this wrongful death action are not property 
of the State [sic], but are property of the heirs. The estate holds 
the proceeds for the benefit thereof. (R. 198-200) 
Although Judge Dever had specifically found that the parties had stipulated and agreed that 
the proceeds were an asset of the estate to be administered according to the Utah Probate 
Code, Judge Young clearly violated the long-standing rule of law regarding the "law of the 
case" doctrine as adopted in the State of Utah. 
The branch of the "law of the case" doctrine that states that one district court judge 
cannot overrule another of equal authority "has evolved to avoid the delays and difficulties 
that arise when one judge is presented with an issue identical to one which has already been 
passed upon by a coordinate judge in the same case". Mascaro v. Davis. 741 P.2d 938,946-
47 (Utah 1987), citing also InreEstateofCassit 656 P.2d 1023,1025 (Utah 1982), Madsen 
v. Salt Lake Citv School Board 645 P.2d 658, 664 (Utah 1982), Sittner v. Big Horn Tar 
Sands & OiL Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984), among others. 
The Utah Supreme Court has found an exception to this branch of the "law of the 
case" doctrine in AMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Mag. Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315 (Utah 
1997). However, that exception exists only where issues decided by the first judge are 
presented to a second judge in a "different light", as where summary judgment initially 
denied is subsequently granted after additional evidence is adduced. Id. at 319. Such an 
exception is clearly not present in the case on appeal. There was no additional evidence 
adduced, only an apparent change of heart by the Respondents after the Decedent's wife 
filed for a statutory homestead allowance. The Respondents did not even file sworn 
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affidavits to support that any such "change of heart" was based on excusable neglect or 
misunderstanding of the law. Respondents simply filed an objection to the Petitioner's 
petition. (R. 91-93). 
POINT II 
THE DECEMBER 13, 1999 ORDER 
CONTAINS NUMEROUS FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT ARE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS OR CONSTITUTE 
LEGAL ERROR, AND ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY ANY EVIDENCE. 
Both the December 13,1999 and March 16,2000 Orders contain findings of fact that 
are clearly erroneous. There were not any sworn affidavits before the Court except the 
verified petitions of Petitioner, nor were there any evidentiary hearings conducted by the trial 
court. Paragraph 1 of the December 13,1999 Order is clearly erroneous. Although the Third 
Cause of Action of the Nevada action alleges wrongful death, there was no evidence that the 
Decedent died as "a result of injuries" sustained in an automobile/pedestrian accident, except 
the June 22, 1999 Order of Judge Dever which stated "the Decedent sustained permanent 
physical injuries that contributed to his death". (R. 71). Paragraph 2 of the December 13, 
1999 Order characterizes the Nevada action as a "wrongful death" action when in fact it 
constituted only one cause of action out of three in the Complaint. (R. 19-24; R. 70). 
Petitioner may have inadvertently contributed to that misconception by Respondents in 
entitling her petition as a "Petition for Approval of Wrongful Death Settlement". (R. 14). 
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However, the parties' Nevada counsel, Bob Benton, in his April 3, 1999 letter to his clients 
states: 
As I have indicated before, Mr. Waters' medical expenses 
exceeded $100,000.00 as a result of his injuries. The suit was 
brought for her personal injuries. The suit survived his 
death and is being brought by his estate. Normally, this 
character of a claim is the asset of the estate and is distributed 
under the laws of the intestate distribution in the state in which 
the deceased was a residence. In this case, that is Utah. Please 
seek local counsel as I am no competent to advise as to the Utah 
law aspect. Mr. Waters' doctor testified that although his cause 
of death was not the accident, it may have had a "substantial 
contribution". With this evidence, I had to file suit naming all 
of the heirs at law which would be his surviving widow and 
children. Normally, this claim would require the testimony of 
the surviving children and surviving widow as to the individual 
loss to society, companionship, and affection, as well as 
pecuniary loss. It is my understanding that none of the children 
lost money as a result of Mr. Waters' demise. In this respect, 
there is a conflict of interest between my various clients. As a 
result, I requested all of you to seek legal representation when 
it comes to distribution of the limited proceeds generated by this 
lawsuit . . . . I asked the parties to contact counsel have the 
lawyer call me with reference to how to handle the distribution 
of this small recovery. Jeanna called and indicated that the 
surviving daughters all got together and agreed that it should 
go into the estate to be distributed under Utah law of dissent 
and distribution . . . . Your agreement to place the net 
proceeds into the estate would obviate the need for the surviving 
daughters to come to Las Vegas and testify at length. There is 
not enough money available to fight over. I am glad that you do 
not want to. I would appreciate a letter from each of you 
indicating your wish to have the net proceeds paid to the Estate 
of Leonard Waters, deceased, to be distributed by the estate now 
pending in Utah . . . (Emphasis added). (R. 178-180 Exhibit 
"C"). 
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Paragraph 3 of the December 13, 1999 Order also contains a finding of fact that is 
clearly erroneous. The proceeds of the Nevada settlement were not turned over to the 
Petitioner as personal representative of the estate to determine the proper shares payable to 
the heirs. The proceeds were turned over to the personal representative to be paid to the 
Estate of Leonard Waters to be distributed by the estate now pending in Utah under the Utah 
law of dissent and distribution. 
The December 13, 1999 Order also contains conclusions of law which are legally 
wrong. Paragraph 6 of said Order states: 
The proceeds of this wrongful death are not property of the 
State [sic] but are the property of the heirs. The estate holds the 
proceeds for the benefit thereof. (R. 198-200). 
This mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law is in direct contravention to the Nevada 
Complaint and the stipulation and agreement of the parties and is clearly unsupported by law. 
The Complaint listed three causes of action, only one of which was maintained by the 
Decedent's heirs and that cause of action was shared jointly with the Decedent's spouse. 
There is no evidence whatsoever of any allocation of the settlement proceeds between the 
estate, the Petitioner, or Respondents. The only evidence is the plain language of the 
stipulation between the parties and the June 22, 1999 Order of the trial court. 
Finally, paragraph 5 of the December 13,1999 Order also cites a Utah case, Switzer 
v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980), as a conclusion of law determinative for a matter 
that was litigated and settled under Nevada law. Switzer recites Utah law and is not 
authority for Nevada law. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY CONTRAVENING THE 
WRITTEN AGREEMENT AND STIPULATION 
OF THE PARTIES IN THE DECEMBER 13, 
1999 ORDER. 
The December 13,1999 Order is also in direct contravention of the stipulation of the 
parties to the Nevada action. Each of the parties to the Nevada action executed a stipulation 
dated April 17, 1999 which states as follows: 
We, the undersigned, being the surviving children of Leonard 
Waters, deceased, do hereby make our wishes known 
regarding the proceeds of the settlement of the above-
referenced case. It is our wish that the net proceeds be paid to 
the Estate of Leonard Waters, deceased, to be distributed by 
the estate now pending in Utah under Utah law of dissent and 
distribution. (Emphasis added). (R. 38-39 Exhibit "E";R. 181-
184 Exhibit "D"). 
Each of the parties executed the aforementioned agreement and stipulation after 
having been advised by Bob Benton, their Nevada counsel, to contact independent counsel 
familiar with probate administration in the State of Utah. The Respondents had ample 
opportunity and notice, and choose unanimously to consent to the payment of the settlement 
proceeds to the Decedent's estate. The Trial Court abused its discretion in essentially 
vacating and reversing that agreement and stipulation without even a sworn affidavit 
suggesting that the Respondents were misguided or not aware of the legal impact of their 
consent. Certainly, there was never any evidence or testimony received to support such a 
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claim, nor was any ever proffered. They simply objected to giving the Decedent's surviving 
spouse a homestead allowance despite the fact that it was mandated by Utah law. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED IN 
ORDERING THE FILING OF AN 
INTERPLEADER ACTION BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
The December 13,1999 Order directing the personal representative to file an action 
in interpleader does not appear to be permitted under Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 22 provides: 
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as 
defendants and may interplead when their claims are such 
that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double liability. It 
is not grounds for objecting to the joinder that the claims of 
several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend do 
not have a common origin or are not identical, but are adverse 
to and independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that 
he is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. 
A defendant exposed to similar liability may obtain such 
interpleader by way of cross claim or counterclaim . . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
In this case, the plaintiff is none other than the Petitioner, Helena Waters, who is the 
personal representative of the Decedent's estate. Petitioner is also an individual plaintiff, as 
are several of the Decedent's adult children [Respondents] in the Nevada action. None of 
the parties have claims against the Petitioner or any third party. Competing claims to 
settlement assets should have been resolved by the Nevada court, but the parties, with full 
knowledge and after being advised to seek independent counsel, elected not to do so and 
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knowingly directed that the proceeds should be paid to and administered as part of the 
Decedent's estate under the laws of intestate succession as adopted in Utah. The facts in this 
case, even if the Respondents were allowed to change their minds, simply do not warrant an 
interpleader action. Interpleader is not the appropriate remedy. It might be if the insurer for 
Michelle Dennison were still holding the settlement proceeds, but such is not the case. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE 
PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
STATUTORY HOMESTEAD ALLOWANCE 
AND THAT THE STATUTORY EXEMPT 
PERSONAL PROPERTY ALLOWANCE 
COULD NOT BE GRANTED WITHOUT AN 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
The March 16, 2000 Order denying the Petitioner, as surviving spouse of the 
decedent, a statutory homestead allowance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-2-401 and 404 
and finding that any exempt personal property allowance set forth in Utah Code Ann. §75-2-
402 was conditional upon an evidentiary hearing to determine whether or not sufficient 
personal property existed to establish or satisfy the allowance is clearly in violation of the 
above statutes. Although the March 16, 2000 Order does not contain a finding of fact that 
there was not any real property contained in the Decedent's probate estate, Petitioner 
acknowledges that there is none. 
This is a case of first impression in the State of Utah since there is no known Utah 
authority directly on point as to the contention of Respondents that a homestead allowance 
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can be satisfied by a nonprobate asset, specifically in this case from joint tenancy property 
held by the Decedent and his wife. The Respondents submitted arguments to the trial court 
that the homestead allowance should be waived or deemed satisfied since the Petitioner 
received the Decedent's joint tenant interest in certain real property. 
However, that argument is not consistent with the statute or case law that the 
homestead allowance be satisfied strictly from probate assets. The American Law Institute 
of the American Bar Association offered some guidance as to what was intended in drafting 
the original homestead allowance provision in the Uniform Probate Code, which was 
originally adopted "as is" by the Utah legislature. 
Many states have constitutional or statutory provisions intended 
to secure to the family a part of the estate in the form of a home 
or residence. Such provisions are outmoded in a society where 
many people no longer own homes, but reside in apartments. 
However, one desirable feature of the traditional homestead 
allowance was that it provided some property for the family 
ahead of claims of creditors against the estate and at the same 
time provided an element of the estate that could not be taken 
away from the family by the decedent's w i l l . . . . Applicable 
only when the decedent is domiciled in the state the homestead 
allowance goes to the surviving spouse . . . . The homestead 
allowance, like the family allowance, is in addition to the share 
of the spouse or child under the law of intestate succession, by 
way of an election of the spouse or a share passing to the spouse 
or child by the decedent's will except where the will specifically 
provides otherwise. Uniform Probate Code Practice Manual 
Vol I (ALI ABA) page 111-112. 
Since there is no Utah case law directly on point, it is appropriate that this Court look to the 
express language of the statutes and to decisions in surrounding states with similar or 
identical statutory language. 
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The Uniform Probate Code provisions dealing with the homestead allowance is 
codified in Utah Code Ann. §75-2-401 and 4041: 
75-2-401. Homestead Allowance - Amount. A surviving 
spouse of a decedent who was domiciled in this state is entitled 
to a homestead allowance of $10,000. If there is no surviving 
spouse, each minor child and each dependent child of the 
decedent is entitled to a homestead allowance amounting to 
$ 10,000 divided by the number of minor and dependent children 
of the decedent. The homestead allowance is exempt from, and 
has priority over, all claims against the estate, except claims for 
reasonable funeral expenses and expenses of administration. 
The homestead allowance is in addition to any share passing to 
the surviving spouse or minor or dependent child by intestate 
succession, but is chargeable against any share passing by the 
will of the decedent, unless the will provides otherwise. 
75-2-404. Source, determination, and documentation. If the 
estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically devised is not 
used to satisfy rights to homestead and exempt property. 
Subject to this restriction, the surviving spouse, the guardians of 
the minor children, or children who are adults may select 
property of the estate as homestead allowance and exempt 
property. The personal representative may make these 
selections if the surviving spouse, the children or the guardian 
of the minor children are unable or fail to do so within a 
reasonable time or if there are no guardians of the minor 
children.... 
The clear language of the statute awards the surviving spouse a $10,000.00 allowance. It 
does not limit the allowance to real property having a value of $ 10,000.00. Furthermore, it 
1
 The statutes were amended effective July 1998 and have been renumbered. However, 
since the Decedent died before the amendments were adopted, the statutes ine ffect at the time 
of Decedent's death are cited. 
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is in addition to any share passing by intestate succession. In this case, the Decedent did not 
leave a will. 
Cases from neighboring states that have addressed this issue support the position that 
the statutory homestead allowance is no longer just an interest in land, but is an allowance 
which may be satisfied by any type of property. Matter of Estate of Merkel 618 P.2d 872, 
877 (Mont. 1980)2. That same principle is supported by decisions in California and Idaho. 
The District Court of Appeals, Second District, in In Re Ronavne's Estate. 231 P.2d 105, 
107-108 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.1951) found that the right of a surviving spouse to a homestead 
is independent of and in addition to any other right or property he or she may have whether 
acquired under the will of the decedent or otherwise, and must be awarded from the estate 
even if there is no community or separately owned real property in which the decedent had 
an interest. In Simmons v. Ewing. 529 P.2d 776,778 (Idaho 1974), the Idaho Supreme Court 
found that under a will which bequeathed all of the Decedent's community property to the 
decedent's trust, and in which only separate property remained, separate property was the 
sole source of funds for the homestead allowance to the surviving spouse. Exempt property 
and homestead allowances were properly awarded to the surviving spouse with funds for the 
allowance being taken from the decedent's separate property. 
While there are no apparent decisions directly on point regarding the homestead 
allowance in Utah, there is a case dealing with exempt personal property allowances under 
2
 The Montana Supreme Court reached this same conclusion regarding the exempt 
personal property allowance in Matter of Estate of Dunlap. 649 P.2d 1303,1305 (Mont. 1982). 
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Utah Code Ann. §75-2-402. A surviving spouse's right to an exempt personal property 
allowance under Utah Code Ann. §75-2-402 is absolute. Estate of Waglev. 760 P.2d 316, 
318 (Utah 1988). In Waglev. the Supreme Court found that after payment of costs of 
administration and a family allowance, there were no assets left to satisfy an exempt personal 
property claim. The probate estate was insolvent. But the Court allowed the absolute 
exempt personal property allowance to be satisfied in full from multi-party bank accounts 
in which the decedent had an interest prior to her death, but which reverted to others upon 
her death. Clearly, the Utah Supreme Court in so ruling clearly recognizes the supremacy 
of the statutory homestead, exempt personal property, and family allowances.3 The Utah 
Supreme Court in Waglev also cites the Montana and Idaho cases set forth above as having 
sound and persuasive interpretations of the Uniform Probate Code provisions regarding 
exempt personal property and homestead allowances. 
The March 16,2000 Order constitutes legal error in that it fails to award an absolute 
statutory homestead allowance from other assets of the estate and further implies that before 
any exempt personal property can be awarded, an evidentiary hearing must be held to 
determine the exact value of personal property held in the estate, and whether there is 
sufficient exempt personal property to justify an allowance.. 
3
 The Waglev decision does not discuss homestead allowances because no homestead 
allowance was ever claimed in that case. Id. at 318. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court clearly erred and abused its discretion in its December 13, 
1999 Order in reversing the June 22, 1999 Order and the stipulation and agreement of the 
parties. Numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the December 13, 
1999 Order are flawed and are clearly erroneous or legally incorrect. Finally, the Trial Court 
ignored the clear language of certain provisions of the Uniform Probate Code as adopted in 
Utah and the case law of neighboring states interpreting those provisions and abused its 
discretion in denying the surviving spouse of the Decedent a homestead allowance and 
refusing to award an exempt personal property allowance until it was established that there 
was sufficient exempt personal property in the estate to justify such an award. Petitioner 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse the Orders of the Trial Court and award her the 
statutorily-mandated homestead and exempt personal property allowances. 
DATED this > day of August, 2000. 
W Y M E . BARTHOLOMEW 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to W. 
Andrew McCullough, Attorney for Respondents, 895 West Center Street, Orem, Utah 84057, 
postage prepaid, this ^ day of August, 2000. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Order of Utah Supreme 
Court dated March 28, 2000 
r U OOP 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0 0 O 0 0 
Fl?..5r£ UTAH StJPtrV' *• 
Case No. 20000017-SC 
973300061 
In the Matter of the 
Estate of: 
Leonard D. Waters, 
Deceased. 
Helena Waters, 
Appellant, 
Darla Jorgenson, Jeanna Scott, 
Barbara D. Reynolds, Theordora 
Ann (Teddi) Brown, Sherrie M. Allan, 
and Frederick L. Waters, 
Appellees. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court upon aPetition for 
Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed pursuant to 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Permission to 
Appeal an Interlocutory Order filed on January 3, 2000 is 
granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to section 78-2-2(4), 
Utah Code Annotated, this matter is transferred to the Utah Court 
of Appeals for disposition. All further pleadings should be 
directed to that court. 
Jft^rt>C M? ^C^ 
Date 
FOR THE COURT: 
Richard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on March 2?, 2000, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
WYNN E. BARTHOLOMEW 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
5505 S 900 E STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84117 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
895 W CENTER ST 
OREM UT 84057 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, TOOELE DEPT 
ATTN: ROENA 
47 S MAIN ST 
TOOELE UT 8 4 074 
Dated this March 2?, 2000 
By _ 
Deputy Clerk 
Mk 
i 
& 
Case No. 20000017 
THIRD DISTRICT, TOOELE DEPT , 973300061 
ADDENDUM 2 
Order of the Utah Court 
of Appeals dated 
April 24, 2000 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
, FILED 
Utah
 Court of Appea,s 
*
PR
 2 4 2000 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
Leonard D. Waters, deceased, 
Helena V. Waters, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of Leonard D. Waters, 
Petitioner, 
Darla Jorgenson, Jeanna Scott, 
Barbara D. Reynolds, Theodora 
Ann (Teddi) Brown, Sherrie M. 
Allan, Frederick L. Waters, 
Respondents. 
J"«aD'Alesandro 
c
'srk of the Court 
ORDER GRANTING AMENDED 
PETITION FOR PERMISSION 
TO APPEAL FROM AN 
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
Case No. 20000017-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Davis. 
Prior to pouring the appeal over to us, the supreme court 
granted petitioner's petition for permission to appeal an 
interlocutory order. This matter is now before us on 
petitioner's amended petition for permission to appeal an 
interlocutory order. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is 
granted. 
The briefing schedule will be set by separate notice. 
Dated this ryy day of April, 2000 
FOR THE COURT: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
ADDENDUM 3 
Order of the Third 
District Court dated 
December 13, 1999 
^Zlr.rxJ'Mi) 
• » ' " : 
III r,- . 
W. ANDRBW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. (2170) 
Attorney for Respondents 
895 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
(801) 222-9535 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
LEONARD D. WATERS, 
ORDER 
Civil No. 97330C0S1 
Deceased, 
oooOooo 
THIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing before Hon, Judge 
David S. Young, Judge of the above entitled court, pursuant to 
petitioners request for homestead and family allowances. The 
court, having read the memorandum of the parties and being fully 
advised on the premises, now makes and enters the following ORDER: 
1. The deceased, Leonard D* Waters, died on or about 
December 14, 1996, as a result of injuries sustained in an 
automobile-pedestrian accident. 
2. A wrongful death action was brought by the heirs of the 
estate, including the Petitioner and Respondents herein. That 
action resulted in a settlement, after expenses and attorneys fees, 
in the approximate amount of $30,000.00. 
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3. The action was brought in the State of Nevada, and the 
proceeds were turned over to petitioner herein, as personal 
representative of the estate, to determine the proper shares 
payable to the heirs. 
4. The primary assets claimed by the estate ac this point 
consist of the proceeds of the wrongful death action aa set forth 
above. 
5. Pursuant to Utah Law; 
...the wrongful death statute creates a new cause of 
action which runs directly to the heirs to compensate 
each for the individual loss suffered by the death. The 
action may be maintained by the personal representative 
for the benefit of the heirs or by one or more of the 
heirs. Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980). 
6. The proceeds of this wrongful death action are not 
property of the State, but are property of the heirs. The estate 
holds the proceeds for the benefit thereof, 
7. The estate of Leonard D. Waters, being in possession of 
the proceeds, is directed to file an interpleader action with this 
court, pursuant to Rule 22 u.R.C.P, to determine how the proceeds 
should be divided between the heirs. 
8. If such an interpleader action has not been filed within 
3 0 days from the date of this Order, Respondents herein may proceed 
by declaratory judgment action to determine their rights in the 
proceeds of the wrongful death action. 
2 
05 _-- ^*A^Jb~ 
DATED this 13-"^day of Jtovembst, 1999. 
BY THE COURT; 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
>-tln 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 1999/ I 
did mail a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order; postage 
prepaid, to; 
Wynn Bartholomew, Esq. 
5505 South S00 East 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
\L InrtJn IJJOA^ 
C: \WPWCe\PROBATK\WATERS .OHD 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-401 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-402 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-403 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-404 
Uniform Probate Code 
Practice Manual, Vol I, 
pgs. 110-114 
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 75-2-401 
stead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance 
. spouse in the property of the other and a renunciation 
rh of all benefits which would otherwise pass to him from 
iter by intestate succession or by virtue of the provisions 
/.will executed before the waiver or property settlement. 
1975 
205.; Proceeding for elective share — Time limit. 
•The surviving spouse may elect to take his elective 
in the augmented estate by filing in the court and 
jg or delivering to the personal representative, if any, a 
>n for the elective share within one year after the date of 
iJor?within six months after the probate of the decedent's 
whichever limitation last expires; but nonprobate trans-
lescribed in Subsection 75-2-202(1 )(a) shall not be in-
l in the augmented estate for the purpose of computing 
Bctive share, if the petition is filed later than one year 
ieath. The court may extend the time for election as it 
t'for cause shown by the surviving spouse before the 
or election has expired. 
Die' surviving spouse shall give notice of the time and 
«t for. hearing to persons interested in the estate and to 
jtributees and recipients of portions of the augmented 
tate .whose interests will be adversely affected by the 
of the elective share. 
fhe surviving spouse may withdraw his demand for an 
e share at any time before entry of a final determination 
court. 
yter notice and hearing, the court shall determine the 
t of the elective share and shall order its payment from 
jets of the augmented net estate or by contribution as 
s appropriate under Section 75-2-207. If it appears that 
or property included in the augmented net estate has 
le into the possession of the personal representative, or 
»adistributed by the personal representative, the court, 
leless, shall fix the liability of any person who has any 
t in the fund or property or who has possession of it, 
ir as trustee or otherwise. The proceeding may be 
ined against fewer than all persons against whom 
5uld be sought, but no person is subject to contribution 
greater amount than he would have been if relief had 
icured against all persons subject to contribution, 
he order or judgment of the court may be enforced as 
ry in suit for contribution or payment in other courts of 
te or other jurisdictions. 1975 
6. Effect of election on benefits by will or stat-
ute. 
rviving spouse is entitled to homestead allowance, 
property, and family allowance, whether or not he 
\ take an elective share. 1975 
7. Charging spouse with gifts received — Li-
ability of others for balance of elective share. 
i the proceeding for an elective share, values included 
mgmented estate which pass or have passed to the 
ig spouse, or which would have passed to the surviving 
but were renounced, are applied first to satisfy the 
share and to reduce any contributions due from other 
ts of transfers included in the augmented estate, 
imaining property of the augmented estate is so ap-
at liability for the balance of the elective share of the 
g spouse is equitably apportioned among the recipi-
he augmented estate in proportion to the value of their 
> therein. 
uy original transferees from, or appointees of, the 
t and their donees, to the extent the donees have the 
or its proceeds, are subject to the contribution to 
> the elective share of the surviving spouse. A person 
liable to contribution may choose to give up the property 
transferred to him or to pay its value as of the time it is 
considered in computing the augmented estate. 1977 
PART 3 
SPOUSE AND CHILDREN UNPROVIDED FOR IN 
WILLS 
75-2-301. O m i t t e d s p o u s e . 
(1) If a testator fails to provide by will for his surviving 
spouse who married the testator after the execution of the 
will, the omitted spouse shall receive the same share of the 
estate he would have received if the decedent left no will 
unless it appears from the will that the omission was inten-
tional or the testator provided for the spouse by transfer 
outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a 
testamentary provision is shown by statements of the testator 
or from the amount of the transfer or other evidence. 
(2) In satisfying a. share provided by this section, the 
devises made by the will abate as provided in Section 75-3-
902. 1975 
75-2-302. Pretermitted children. 
(1) If a testator fails to provide in the will for any of the 
testator's children who were born or adopted after the execu-
tion of the will, or for the issue of a deceased child, if that 
deceased child was born or adopted after the execution of the 
will, the omitted child or issue receives a share in the estate 
equal in value to that which the child or issue would have 
received if the testator had died intestate unless: 
(a) it appears from the will that the omission was 
intentional; 
(b) when the will was executed the testator had one or 
more children and devised substantially all the estate to 
or for the exclusive benefit of the other parent of the 
omitted child, or of the deceased child whose issue are 
omitted; or 
(c) the testator provided for the child or issue by 
transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer 
be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by state-
ments of the testator or from the amount of the transfer or 
other evidence. 
(2) If at the time of execution of the will the testator fails to 
provide in the will for a living child solely because the testator 
believes the child to be dead, the child receives a share in.the 
estate equal in value to that which the child would have 
received if the testator had died intestate. 
(3) In satisfying a share provided by this section, the 
devises made by the will abate as provided in Section 75-3-
902. 
(4) If the issue of a deceased child takes the share of the 
deceased child under Section 75-2-605, the issue may not be 
considered pretermitted and may not receive a share of the 
estate under this section. 
(5) If it appears from the will that the omission of a child of 
the testator was intentional and if no express provision is 
made in the will for the issue of the child, the testator will be 
considered to have intended to also omit the issue. 1988 
PART 4 
EXEMPT PROPERTY AND ALLOWANCES 
75-2-401. Homestead allowance — Amount. 
A surviving spouse of a decedent who was domiciled in this 
state is entitled to a homestead allowance of $10,000. If there 
is no surviving spouse, each minor child and each dependent 
child of the decedent is entitled to a homestead allowance 
amounting to $10,000 divided by the number of minor and 
75-2-402 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 116 
dependent children of the decedent. The homestead allowance 
is exempt from, and has priority over, all claims against the 
estate, except claims for reasonable funeral expenses and 
expenses of administration. The homestead allowance is in 
addition to any share passing to the surviving spouse or minor 
or dependent child by intestate succession, but is chargeable 
against any share passing by the will of the decedent, unless 
the will provides otherwise. 1988 
75-2-402. Exempt proper ty—Amount . 
In addition to the homestead allowance, the surviving 
spouse of a decedent who was domiciled in this state is entitled 
from the estate to value not exceeding $5,000 in excess of any 
security interests therein in household furniture, automobiles, 
furnishings, appliances, and personal effects. If there is no 
surviving spouse, children of the decedent are entitled jointly 
to the same value. If encumbered chattels are selected and if 
the value in excess of security interests, plus that of other 
exempt property, is less than $5,000, or if there is not $5,000 
worth of exempt property in the estate, the spouse or children 
are entitled to other assets of the estate, if any, to the extent 
necessary to make up the $5,000 value. Rights to exempt 
property and assets needed to make up a deficiency of exempt 
property have priority over all claims against the estate, 
except reasonable funeral expenses, and the right to any 
assets to make up a deficiency of exempt property shall abate 
as necessary to permit prior payment of the reasonable 
funeral expenses, homestead allowance, and family allowance. 
These rights are in addition to any benefit or share passing to 
the surviving spouse or children by intestate succession, but is 
chargeable against any share passing by the will of the 
decedent unless the will provides otherwise. 1988 
75-2-403. Family al lowance. 
(1) In addition to the right to homestead allowance and 
exempt property, if the decedent was domiciled in this state, 
the surviving spouse and minor children whom the decedent 
was obligated to support and children who were in fact being 
supported by him are entitled to a reasonable allowance in 
money out of the estate for their maintenance during the 
period of administration. The allowance may date from the 
death of the decedent but may not continue for longer than one 
year if the estate is inadequate to discharge allowed claims. 
The allowance may be paid as a lump sum or in periodic 
installments. It is payable to the surviving spouse, if living, for 
the use of the surviving spouse and minor and dependent 
children; otherwise to the children, or persons having their 
care and custody; but in case any minor child or dependent 
child is not living with the surviving spouse, the allowance 
may be made partially to the child or his guardian or other 
person having his care and custody, and partially to the 
spouse, as their needs may appear. The family allowance is 
exempt from and has priority over all claims but not over 
reasonable funeral expenses and the homestead allowance. 
(2) The family allowance is not chargeable against any 
benefit or share passing to the surviving spouse or children by 
the will of the decedent unless otherwise provided, by intes-
tate succession, or by way of elective share. The death of any 
person entitled to family allowance terminates his right to 
allowances not yet paid. 1975 
75-2-404. Source, determination, and documentat ion. 
If the estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically 
devised is not used to satisfy rights to homestead and exempt 
property. Subject to this restriction, the surviving spouse, the 
guardians of the minor children, or children who are adults 
may select property of the estate as homestead allowance and 
exempt property. The personal representative may make these 
selections if the surviving spouse, the children or the guard-
ians of the minor children are unable or fail to do so within a 
reasonable time or if there are no guardians of the minor 
children. The personal representative may execute an instru-
ment or deed of distribution to establish the ownership of 
property taken as homestead allowance or exempt property. 
He may determine the family allowance and may disburse 
funds of the estate in payment of the family allowance in a 
lump sum or periodic installments, or a combination, but not 
exceeding the total sum of $6,000. The personal representa-
tive or any interested person aggrieved by any selection, 
determination, payment, proposed payment, or failure to act 
under this section may petition the court for appropriate 
relief, which relief may provide a family allowance larger or 
smaller than that which the personal representative deter-
mined or could have determined. 1979 
PART 5 
WILLS 
75-2-501. Who may make a will. 
Any person 18 or more years of age who is of sound mind 
may make a will. 1975 
75-2-502. Execution. 
Except as provided for holographic wills, writings within 
Section 75-2-513, and wills within Section 75-2-506, every will 
shall be in writing signed by the testator or in the testator's 
name by some other person in the testator's presence and by 
his direction, and shall be signed by at least two persons each 
of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's ac-
knowledgment of the signature or of the will. The signing by 
the witnesses must be in the testator's presence and in the 
presence of each other. 1975 
75-2-503. Holographic will. 
A will which does not comply with Section 75-2-502 is valid 
as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signa-
ture and the material provisions are in the handwriting of the 
testator. If there are several holographic wills in existence 
with conflicting provisions, the holographic will which is 
established by date or other circumstances to be the will that 
was last executed shall control. If it is impossible to determine 
which will was last executed, the consistent provisions of the 
several wills shall be considered valid and the inconsistent 
provisions shall be considered invalid. 1977 
75-2-504. Self-proved will. 
(1) Any will may be simultaneously executed, attested, and 
made self-proved, by acknowledgment of it by the testator and 
affidavits of the witnesses, each made before an officer autho-
rized to administer oaths under the laws of the state where 
execution occurs, whether or not that officer is also a witness 
to the will, and evidenced by the officer's certificate, under 
official seal, in substantially the following form: 
"I, , the testator, sign my name to this instrument this 
— day of , 19 , and being first duly sworn, do hereby 
declare to the undersigned authority that I sign and execute 
this instrument as my last will and that I sign it willingly, or 
willingly direct another to sign for me, that I execute it as my 
free and voluntary act for the purposes expressed in it, and 
that I am 18 years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no 
constraint or undue influence. 
Testator 
We, , , the witnesses, sign our names to this 
instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby declare 
to the undersigned authority that the testator signs and 
executes this instrument as his last will and that he signs 
it willingly, or willingly directs another to sign for him, 
and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of the 
voiurne i B 
eoneo BY RICHORD Y wei±man 
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Educational Director, Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Cede 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
4025 CHESTNUT STREET • PHILADELPHIA • PENNSYLVANIA 1910^ 
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Unlike the rule existing in some jurisdictions, assertion of an elective 
share remedy under the Code does not involve a rejection of the dece-
dent's will. Hence, there is no reason why an electing spouse might not 
continue to claim the benefit of a tax apportionment clause contained 
in the will. 
II . EXEMPTIONS 
A. Family Allowance 
The family of a decedent who was domiciled in the state are entitled 
to a reasonable allowance for maintenance during the period of admin-
istration. (Section 2-403) The personal representative may determine 
the allowance himself, or he may petition the court for a larger allow-
ance. The authority of the personal representative to act without a 
court order is limited to a total sum of $6,000, which may be paid in 
a lump sum or in periodic installments not exceeding $500 per month 
for one year. 
The purpose of the family allowance is to provide for support of the 
family while the estate is undergoing administration. In determining 
the amount, particularly when a court order is required to approve an 
allowance in excess of $6,000, account should be taken of both the 
previous standard of living and the nature of other resources available 
to the family to meet current living expenses. If the surviving spouse 
has a substantial income, this should be taken into account. This would 
be particularly true where the husband is the surviving spouse, since 
he usually is not accustomed to being supported by his wife's wealth. 
In general the purpose of the allowance is to provide for a period of 
adjustment. Other assets available to the family may entirely eliminate 
the necessity for any family allowance. For instance, a husband may 
have created a living trust that would provide immediate income to 
the family after his death, so that there would be no disruption in the 
standard of living. If life insurance proceeds have been paid to the 
family in a lump sum, or are being paid in periodic installments, con-
sideration can be given to whether the decedent intended these pro-
ceeds to be used for the period of adjustment or to be conserved as 
capital. If a husband has been the principal source of family support, 
the wife should not be expected to use her capital to support the family 
until his estate is available. 
How much allowance is necessary must be determined in the indi-
vidual case on its facts. Need is always relative and what is reasonable 
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has to be decided in the light of many factors. Since the family allow-
ance comes ahead of claims of creditors, the court may not continue 
the allowance for longer than one year if the estate is inadequate to 
discharge allowed claims. 
What members of the family may participate in the allowance? The 
surviving spouse, minor children whom the decedent was obligated to 
support, and children who were, in fact, being supported by the dece-
dent are within the scope of the allowance. The whole allowance may 
be paid to the surviving spouse for the benefit of the spouse and the 
children. However, if a child is not living with the surviving spouse, 
the allowance may be divided between the spouse and the child as their 
needs appear. If there is no spouse the allowance may be paid to the 
children or to persons having their care and custody. 
The facility of payment provision in Section 5-103 provides greater 
detail regarding payment-of sums due to minors for whom no con-
servator has been appointed. If a person entitled to the family allow-
ance dies, his right to any future payments terminates. Hence, it was 
the view of the draftsmen that a family allowance award to a surviving 
spouse is a terminable interest that is not includable in the federal 
estate tax marital deduction. 
The family allowance is not charged against the share passing to the 
surviving spouse and children by intestate succession or to the elective 
share of the surviving spouse. Similarly, it is ordinarily not charged 
against any provision in the will of the decedent, but the will may 
expressly provide otherwise. Thus, if the will makes a provision for 
the surviving spouse and states that it is in lieu of a family allowance, 
the wife could not take the provision under the will without having the 
family allowance charged against it. 
B. Homestead Allowance 
Many states have constitutional or statutory provisions intended to se-
cure to the family a part of the estate in the form of a home or resi-
dence. Such provisions are outmoded in a society where many people 
no longer own homes but reside in apartments. However, one desirable 
feature of the traditional homestead law was that it provided some 
property for the family ahead of claims of creditors against the estate 
and at the same time provided an element of the estate that could not 
be taken away from the family by the decedent's will. The Code retains 
both of these features in terms of a dollar allowance, called a homestead 
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allowance. (Section 2-^01) This allowance gives the family a modest 
nest egg; $5,000 has been suggested as an amount, but the precise 
amount is left to the local legislature for determination at the time the 
Code is adopted. The homestead allowance has priority over all claims 
against the estate, and over all gifts by will. Applicable only when the 
decedent was domiciled in the state, the homestead allowance goes to 
the surviving spouse; and if there is no surviving spouse, the allowance 
is divided equally among minor children and dependent children of 
the decedent. Note that unlike the family allowance where only those 
minor children who the decedent was obligated to support may be 
beneficiaries, the homestead allowance may benefit all minor children 
of the decedent as well as other children who were dependent on him. 
Again, the homestead allowance, like the family allowance, is in addi-
tion to the share of the spouse or child under the law of intestate suc-
cession, by way of an election by the spouse, or a share passing to the 
spouse or child by the decedent's will except where the will specifically 
provides othenvise. 
In states where there is a constitutional right to a homestead, this 
constitutional right must be deducted from the homestead allowance 
under the Code. 
C. Exempt Property 
In addition to the homestead allowance, the surviving spouse of the 
decedent is entitled to certain exempt property. (Section 2-402) As is 
the case with all family rights described by Parts 2 and 4 of Article II, 
the right to exempt property is limited to survivors of a decedent who 
was domiciled in the state. If there is no surviving spouse, then the 
children are entitled to the same right as the surviving spouse would 
have had. In the case of exempt property, this includes all the children 
of the decedent, not just minor or dependent children. The children 
share equally in this property. What property is exempt? Up to $3,500 
in household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and per-
sonal effects may be selected. If the estate is othenvise sufficient, prop-
erty specifically devised may not be used to satisfy the right to exempt 
property. If the chattels selected are subject to a security interest so 
tHat the value in excess of the security interests is less than $3,500 or 
if the exempt property in the estate does not amount to $3,500, the 
spouse or children would then be entitled to other property in the 
estate necessary to make up the $3,500 amount. The right to exempt 
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property has priority over all claims against the estate, except that 
the right to assets to make up a deficiency of exempt property will not 
take priority over the homestead allowances and family allowance. 
The right to exempt property (and other property to make up the 
deficiency, if any) is in addition to the property passing to the surviv-
ing spouse or children by the will of the decedent unless the will pro-
vides othenvise. This means that items of exempt property may be 
specifically devised only if there are other items available to make up 
the $3,500 amount and that the exempt property will normally come 
out of the residue. Of course, the testator may force the spouse or chil-
dren to elect to take property under the will in lieu of the exempt 
property by an express provision in the will, e.g., "this provision for 
my wife is expressly in lieu of her right to homestead allowance and 
exempt property, and any family allowance to my wife shall be charged 
against this provision under my will." 
A marital property settlement agreement as described by Section 
2-204, by which the spouse has waived all rights in the decedent's 
estate, would bar the spouse's right to all exemptions described by 
Article II, Part 4, but would not bar the rights of children. If not 
barred, the right to exempt property is in addition to any elective 
share of the spouse and comes out of the estate before rights under 
intestate succession are determined if the estate passes intestate. 
The spouse may select appropriate property as exempt within the 
rules outlined above. If there is no spouse, adult children may select 
property as exempt, and guardians of any minor children may select 
for them. If there is no guardian, the personal representative may 
make the selections on behalf of the minor children. If no selection is 
made by the surviving spouse or the children or their guardians within 
a reasonable time, the personal representative may select property. The 
personal representative may execute appropriate documents in order to 
establish the ownership of property taken as exempt. For example, if the 
surviving spouse selects an automobile as an item of exempt property, 
the personal representative has power to execute whatever documents 
may be required by the state Motor Vehicle Department to transfer 
ownership. In appropriate cases he may execute a document known as 
a "deed of distribution." (Section.3-907) 
Suppose that the surviving spouse wishes to select two items of 
normally exempt property, household furnishings in the amount of 
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$2,000 and an automobile valued at $2,100, and that none of these 
items have been specifically devised. The spouse is entitled to exempt 
property in a value not exceeding $3,500 and the selected items exceed 
this by $600. Although the Code has no express provision for this situa-
tion, there appears to be no reason why the spouse could not select 
these items by paying the $600 excess to the personal representative. 
This would in effect be a selection of exempt property in the amount 
of $3,500 and a sale as to the $600, the personal representative having 
full power to sell under Article III of the Code. 
Viewed together, the exemptions described in Sections 2-401 through 
2-404 have great significance in relation to the administration of es-
tates, particularly those of small or modest size. The aggregate value of 
the exemptions and allowances that can be paid without court order is 
$14,500 when the survivors include a spouse or dependent minor chil-
dren, and $3,500 if only nondependent children survive. If the gross 
value of the assets of the estate do not exceed the exemptions, the per-
sonal representative can distribute the estate in kind to the beneficiaries 
of the exemptions without being concerned whether the estate is testate 
or intestate, solvent or insolvent. Land as well as chattels or money 
can be used to satisfy the exemptions; the personal representative's 
deed of distribution will assure the spouse, as the recipient of property 
distributed as exempt, that a marketable title can be given to any good 
faith purchaser; Section 3-910 and the definition of "distributee" in 
Section 1-201 control. The only risks for the personal representative 
in such a distribution would be those of the proper identity of the 
distributee as the real spouse or child of the decedent and the question 
of value. 
If the estate is worth more than the available exemptions, the per-
sonal representative, nonetheless, can make quick distribution of up 
to $14,500 in any kind of estate assets with minimum risk. If the 
exemption payment is made in cash so that there can be no question 
of valuation or interference with specific gifts made by a will, the only 
risk would be the identity of the recipients. Distributions in kind may 
pose valuation problems; Section 3-906 would be relevant. Distribu-
tions of specifically devised assets would be wrongful if other assets are 
available to discharge the exemptions. Even a wrongful distribution 
would give the distributee a title that would become marketable in 
the hands of a good faith purchaser. See Section 3-910. Sections 3-909 
and 5-1006 are relevant to the liability of distributees of improperly 
distributed assets. 
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III . UNINTENTIONAL OMISSION OF A SPOUSE OR 
CHILDREN IN THE W I L L 
Under certain circumstances, a testator may execute a will and unin-
tentionally omit certain persons for whom he would normally provide 
at the time of his death. The Code specifically covers three of these 
situations: 
1. Where the surviving spouse married the testator after execution 
of the will (Section 2-301) 
2. Where children are born to the testator or adopted by him after 
execution of the will (Section 2-302) and 
3. Where the testator believes one of his children to be dead at the 
time he executes the will (Section 2-302) 
In any of these cases the omission may be intentional. Thus, a testator 
might execute a will in contemplation of a pending marriage and in-
tentionally make no provision for the spouse and expressly state in the 
will that he intended to make no provision. In such a case the spouse 
would still be protected by an elective share. Note that the will is not 
revoked either by the subsequent marriage or even by a marriage and 
birth of a child after execution of the will. Section 2-508. Again, a 
testator may execute a will leaving all his property to his spouse if she 
survives him and intentionally make no provision for his children, 
including any afterborn children. Or a testator may have a son who 
has run away from home and who the testator believes is dead, but 
who would be disinherited even if the testator thought him alive. The 
provisions of Part 3 of Article II are intended to protect the spouse 
and children in the enumerated situations only if the omission was 
unintentional. Hence, the Code permits, within certain limits, evidence 
to establish whether the testator would have wanted a share for the 
spouse or child. In the case of a spouse married after the execution of 
the will, it must appear from the will that the omission was intentional 
or that the testator may have provided for the spouse by transfer out-
side the will, such as life insurance or joint tenancy arrangements. In 
such cases the intent of the testator that these transfers be in lieu of 
a testamentary provision may be shown by evidence of the testator's 
statements or the amount of the transfer, or other evidence. If a child 
born or adopted after execution of the testator's will claims a share by 
reason of these Code sections, his claim may be defeated if it appears 
from the will that the omission was intentional or, if when the will 
was executed, the testator had one or more children and still devised 
ADDENDUM 5 
Order of the 
Third District Court 
dated March 16, 2000 
Civil No. 973300061 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. (2170) 
Attorney for Respondents 
895 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
(801) 222-9635 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
---000O000 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: : ORDER 
LEONARD D. WATERS, 
Deceased. 
oooOooo 
THIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing before Hon. David S. 
Young, Judge of the above-entitled court, on January 31, 2000, 
pursuant to Petitioner's Objection to Proposed Order and Motion for 
Reconsideration, Petition for Approval of Homestead Exemption and 
Personal Property Allowance, and Petition for Approval of Family 
Allowance and Reimbursement of Funeral Expenses. Petitioner was 
represented by her attorney, Wynn Bartholomew. Respondents were 
represented by their attorney, W. Andrew McCullough. The Court, 
having heard the arguments of the parties and being fully advised 
in the premises, now makes and enters the following ORDER: 
1. Petitioner's objections to the Order of December 13, 1999 
raised by Petitioner are hereby denied. 
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2. The Motion for Reconsideration made by Petitioner is 
hereby denied. 
3. Petitioner's Petition for Approval of Homestead Allowance 
is denied on the basis that there is no real property in this 
estate, and that allowance presupposes the existence of real 
property in the probate estate before it can be awarded. 
4. The Court determines that an evidentiary hearing is 
necessary to determine the extent of any exempt personal property 
allowance, conditioned on the value of personal property in the 
estate. An evidentiary hearing is also necessary on the question 
of whether a family allowance should be awarded to Petitioner as 
Decedent's spouse. 
5. The stay order on the December 13, 1999 Order pending a 
ruling on Petitioner's Objections and Requests for Reconsideration 
is hereby vacated. The time for appeal of an interlocutory order 
commences from the date of this Order. 
6. The Court further denies Petitioner's request to certify 
this matter for appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) U.R.C.P. It is the 
opinion of the Court that the matters of personal property 
allowance and family allowance should be determined prior to any 
appeal. 
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DATED this day of March, 2 000. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the j J ! ^ day of February, 2000, I 
did mail a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Wynn Bartholomew, Esq 
5505 South 900 East 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 
C:\WPDOCS\PROBATE\WATERS.OR2 
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ADDENDUM 6 
Order of the 
Third District Court 
Dated June 22, 1999 
WYNN E. BARTHOLOMEW #0233 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Plaza I at the Sports Mall 
5505 South 900 East #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 263-0569 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
LEONARD D. WATERS, 
Deceased. 
ORDER APPROVING 
WRONGFUL DEATH SETTLEMENT 
Civil No. 973300061 
Upon review of the Petition for Approval of Wrongful Death Settlement filed with the 
Court by Petitioner, Helena Waters, on April 27,1999, the Court finds that: 
1. The required notice has been given or waived, including notice by publication, by 
posting, and by mail pursuant to the Order of this Court dated May 11, 1999. 
2. On or about December 23, 1997 Petitioner, Helena Waters, individually, as 
surviving spouse, and as personal representative of Decedent's estate, and Darla Jorgensen, Jeana 
Scott, Barbara Reynolds, Teddi Brown, Sherry Waters, and Frederick Waters, individually and 
as surviving children of the Decedent, filed a wrongful death and personal injury action against 
Michelle Denison in the District Court of Clark County, State of Nevada, Case No. A382762. 
3. The Plaintiffs in said actiort retained Nevada attorney, Robert Benton, on a 
contingent fee basis to pursue an action against Michelle Denison for damages caused to and 
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injuries sustained by the Decedent in an auto/pedestrian accident on January 18, 1996 in Clark 
County, Nevada, wherein the Decedent sustained permanent physical injuries that contributed to 
his death on December 14, 1996. 
4. Each of the Plaintiffs in that action, including Petitioner acting individually and 
on behalf of the estate as Personal Representative, entered into written Fee Agreements with 
Robert Benton providing for payment of one-third (1/3) of the gross recovery received from said 
settlement as attorney's fees. 
5. On or about April 7, 1999, the Plaintiffs reached a settlement with Michelle 
Denison and her insurer for the insurance policy limits of $100,000.00 payable to the Plaintiffs. 
6. Contemporaneously with the execution of the settlement agreement, Mailhandlers 
Benefit Plan, which had a subrogration claim for medical services provided to the Decedent, 
agreed to reduce its subrogration claim to $30,000.00. 
7. All of the Plaintiffs in the above-referenced lawsuit are also heirs of the Decedent's 
estate. 
8. Since the aforementioned settlement did not differentiate between the various 
claims of the estate and those of the individual Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs stipulated and agreed that 
the net proceeds from the settlement of the aforementioned lawsuit shall be considered an asset 
of the Decedent's estate and shall be distributed to the heirs of Decedent's estate according to the 
laws of intestate succession for the State of Utah. 
9. The attorney for the Plaintiffs in said wrongful death action is hereby authorized 
and ordered to pay the net proceeds from the aforementioned settlement to the personal 
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representative of Decedent's estate, Helena Waters or her attorney, for administration and 
subsequent distribution to heirs. 
DATED this ^ day of June, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOWOPS^BBSU^i^ DE VER 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Approving Wrongful Death 
Settlement, postage prepaid, this IT*11 day of June, 1999, to the following: 
Helena Waters 
157 East 100 South 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Darla Jorgenson 
11042 North 5600 West 
Highland Utah 84003 
Jeanna Scott 
749 West 2260 North 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
Barbara D. Reynolds 
1150 North 200 West #38 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
Theodora Ann (Teddi) Brown 
1150 North 200 West #32 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
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Sherry M. Allan 
1150 North 200 West #38 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
Frederick Leonard Waters 
12523 North 79th Drive 
Preoria, Arizona 85381 
Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Heirs 
895 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
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